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11 14 May 70

AGDA (M) (6 Oct 70)

FOR OT-UT-702171

8 October 1970

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d  
Artillery Group ~~Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)~~

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9 Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 30 Apr 70.  
*Kenneth G. Wickham*

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as

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP  
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14 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 23d  
Artillery Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R2)

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## 1. (C) SECTION 1. OPERATIONS; SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

### a. Personnel

(1) The 23d Artillery Group was relieved from assignment to US Army Vietnam and assigned to II Field Force Vietnam on 5 February 1970.

(2) Significant S1 Activities:

(a) Casualties: There were 4 KIA and 62 WIA in this quarter. Non-hostile Casualties: There were 2 deaths and 37 injuries in this quarter.

(b) At the close of the period, the following critical personnel shortages existed:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>PCT</u>
05B20 Radio Operator	8	5	63
05C20 Radio Tr Operator	26	19	73
13B20 Fld Arty Crewman	72	47	65
13B40 Arty Crewman	186	153	82
13E20 Fire Direction Computer	130	113	81
13E40 Chief FDC Computer	44	21	48
31C40 Commo Chief	13	9	70
35D20 Metro Equip Repairman	4	1	25
36K20 Field Wireman	158	101	64
63C20 Track Mechanic	36	25	69
63C40 Track Mech Mtr SGT	10	5	50
71T20 Maint Data Clerk	21	4	19
76Y40 Supply SGT	25	18	72

(c) Awards presented during the period were as follows: 5 Silver Stars, 1 Legion of Merit, 1 Distinguished Flying Cross, 1 Soldiers Medal, 413 Bronze Stars, 61 Air Medals, 748 Army Commendation Medals and 27 Purple Hearts.

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## b. Operations

(1) The 23d Artillery Group continues support of operations in the III Corps Tactical Zone. The Group Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and all attached battalions were engaged in combat operations, troop movements, and training during the entire reporting period (89 days).

(2) The Group continues to make effective use of its automatic and automatic secure relays on Nui Ba Den (XT2859).

(3) Howitzer Pit Report: During the reporting period, the 23d Artillery Group initiated construction on its standard all-weather 155mm towed howitzer (M114A1) parapets. These pits are constructed on a three phase concept, designed to provide for continuous improvement of the position throughout occupation. To date, the Group has had much success with these all-weather parapets. The parapet design has proven extremely functional for use in Vietnam and continued emphasis will be placed on the implementation of these pits through the coming monsoon season.

(4) The Group continues to participate in the Artillery Dong Tien (Forward Together) Program. The program has been particularly successful in the area of Combined Unit Refresher Training. 1003 hours of training have been presented to 246 personnel from four ARVN Artillery battalions. Instruction included training in fire direction, firing battery, survey, maintenance, and communications. The Group has also been active in providing survey control to ARVN firing positions, calibrating ARVN howitzers and conducting combined US/ARVN Battalion and Battery visits.

(5) On 19 March 1970, Group began operating a combined US/ARVN Fire Support Coordination Center in Binh Duong Province. The Center provides fire support coordination and back-up air warning for all US and ARVN ground, naval and air forces operating in Binh Duong Province.

(6) On 22 April 1970, the 23d Artillery Group was alerted to provide an Artillery Control Headquarters for support of Operation Rock Crusher. The Control Headquarters (Task Force Baker), commanded by Colonel John E. Baker, 23d Artillery Group Commander, was to control one 155 towed battery, B/5/42; two composite 155/8" batteries (6 x 155 and 2 x 8"), A/1/27 (155) with two tubes of C/2/32 (8") and C/1/27 (155) with two tubes of A/2/32 (8"), and two platoons of 175's; two tubes of C/2/32 (175) and two tubes of P/7/8 (175). This US Artillery was to be used in support of the III ARVN Corps operation in Cambodia (See Inclosure 1). The 23d Artillery Group was tasked with operation of an Air Warning Control Center (AWCC), which would control all US Artillery firing within and into Cambodia, and operation of a Fire Support Element (FSE) which, in addition to the normal inherent responsibilities of an FSE, would serve as a clearing agency for all US Artillery fired within and into Cambodia.

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Task Force Baker was organized with personnel assigned to the 23d Artillery Group. Manning requirements consisted of 40 Officers, NCO's and EM.

On 22 April 1970, the Group Commander directed a reconnaissance be made of all proposed battery positions, and that close liaison be established with III ARVN Corps, in order to stay abreast of the situation. The 23d Artillery Group published a complete OPORD on 25 April 1970. This was accomplished by concurrent planning and close liaison with III ARVN Corps Artillery. On 25 April 1970, III ARVN Corps Artillery published the Fire Support Annex to the III Corps plan, which was received by 23d Group on 26 April 1970.

Survey and registration plans were initiated by Task Force Baker to enhance the delivery of timely and effective fire. All batteries were placed on a common grid and were initially registered using the AN/MPQ-4 Radar. Precision registrations were conducted as soon as possible following the firing of the initial preparations.

Due to the extensive coordination requirements between ARVN maneuver forces and Task Force Baker, a liaison team from Task Force Baker was assigned to and collocated with each Task Force Headquarters. A Senior Liaison Officer was also collocated with III ARVN Corps Artillery. In addition to his normal duties, the Senior Liaison Officer was tasked with obtaining III ARVN Corps Artillery clearance for all US Artillery fired in support of non-contact missions within Cambodia.

CO, Task Force Baker, directed that the FSE be collocated with III ARVN Corps Artillery Headquarters at Go Dau Ha (XT366251). On 25 April 1970, the quartering party moved to Go Dau Ha and established the Headquarters. Task Force Baker became operational at 261200H April 1970.

Phase 1 of Operation Rock Crusher was initiated on 29 April 1970 with a simultaneous attack by three mobile ARVN task forces.

Task Force 225, consisting of the 46th ARVN Regimental CP, the 3d ARVN Infantry Battalion, the 10th ARVN Cav Battalion, the 15th ARVN Cav Battalion and A Battery, 252d ARVN Artillery, attacked southeast from the vicinity of "Straight Edge Woods" (XT1133), along two parallel axis.

Task Force 333, consisting of a CP element from Headquarters, 3d ARVN Ranger Group, the 2d ARVN Ranger Bn of the 3d ARVN Ranger Group, the 5th ARVN Cav Battalion, four tubes of B Battery, 181st ARVN Artillery and two tubes of A Battery, 52d ARVN Artillery, in the center, attacked to the west, from the vicinity of XT1629, along and north of the O Chek Canal to link up with Task Force 225.

Task Force 318, consisting of the 18th ARVN Cav CP, the 18th ARVN Cav Battalion, and the 2d ARVN Ranger Battalion, and four tubes of C Battery, 46th ARVN Artillery, two tubes of A Battery, 51st ARVN Artillery, and two tubes of C Battery, 253d ARVN Artillery, in the south, attacked west through the northern portion of the "Angel's Wing" with Highway 1 as the southern boundary. In addition, four tubes of C Battery, 251st ARVN Artillery, four tubes of C Battery, 38th ARVN Artillery and A Battery, 38th ARVN Artillery deployed in a general support role for support of the operation.

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Task Force Baker deployed initially with all units in general support and located in South Vietnam. Battery locations were as follows:

A/1/27 (155)	FSB Laurel	XT200345	Closed 281855H Apr 70
C/1/27 (155)	FSB Murray	XT091443	Closed 281650H Apr 70
B/5/42 (155T)	FSB Harry	XT339040	Closed 271840H Apr 70
2T A/2/32 (8")	FSB Murray	XT091443	Closed 281650H Apr 70
2T C/2/32 (8")	FSB Laurel	XT200345	Closed 281905H Apr 70
2T C/2/32 (175)	FSB Phillip	XT300287	Closed 281810H Apr 70
2T B/7/8 (175)	FSB Jarrett	XT418123	Closed 261450H Apr 70

At 290127H April 1970, A/1/27 fired the first round into Cambodia on a radar registration mission at grid XT110270. At 290830H April 1970, all batteries participated in an 80 minute preparation in support of the initial attacks of the three ARVN task forces. 979 rounds were expended in the preparation. The batteries continued to fire blocking fires throughout the day. By the end of the first day, Task Force 225 had achieved all objectives while meeting with limited opposition. Task Force 318 met with equal success. Task Force 333, in the center, moved into the attack with the same momentum; however, shortly thereafter they engaged major elements of an NVA Regiment in the vicinity of the canal generally running from XT1528 to XT1526. Heavy fighting, supported by Task Force Baker Artillery fires, continued through most the afternoon and evening. Commander, Task Force 333, credited the US Artillery with 230 enemy KIA as a result of this action. The fires of Task Force Baker collapsed a major bunker complex resulting in major enemy losses.

On 30 April 1970, Task Force 333's area of operation was narrowed with Task Force 225 and 318 assuming responsibility for equal portions of the area left uncovered. The bulk of the efforts on this day were spent in sweeping and securing the area. Task Force Baker continued to provide supporting fires throughout the day and displaced the batteries as indicated below to support upcoming operations:

A/1/27 displaced from FSB Laurel to FSB Lou (XT194292), closed 301707H Apr 70.  
C/1/27 displaced from FSB Murray to FSB Murray II (XT098408), closed 301756H Apr 70.  
2T A/2/32 (8") displaced from FSB Murray to FSB Murray II (XT098408), closed 301707H Apr 70.  
2T C/2/32 (8") displaced from FSB Laurel to FSB Lou (XT194292), closed 301816H Apr 70.  
2T C/2/32 (175) displaced from FSB Phillip to FSB Laurel (XT198344), closed 301846H Apr 70

Significant achievements were attained during the first two days of the operation. No major obstacles were encountered in coordinating the US Artillery support of this operation. As of this date the operation continues. The next ORLL will summarize the activities of Task Force Baker during that reporting period.

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(7) During the reporting period, the 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery engaged in operations supporting 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Service Battery, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery, remained at Camp William S. Price (YT047118)

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period A Battery was located at FSB Tan Tru (vicinity XS655620) with the mission of GS, IIFFORCEV with POF to 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (US) with supporting fires to 25th ARVN Division. On 11 February 1970, three howitzers displaced by road march from FSB Tan Tru and FSB Thu Thua to Phu Loi (vicinity XT867162) on the first phase of their move to FSB Granite (vicinity XS926080). On 11 April 1970, A Battery moved by road march from Phu Loi to Quan Loi (vicinity XT810903) for the second phase of deployment to FSB Granite. On 14 April 1970, A Battery moved from Quan Loi by air lift to FSB Granite (vicinity XU926080) completing the final phase of deployment. On 21 April 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Granite to Duster Compound (vicinity YT131113). The Battery's mission at Duster Compound was GS, IIFFORCEV with POF to 199th Light Infantry Brigade. On 23 April 1970, A Battery displaced from Duster Compound to FSB Verna (vicinity YT271102) with the mission of GS, IIFFORCEV. Completing the moves for the reporting period, on 28 April 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Verna to Quan Loi and maintained the mission of GS, IIFFORCEV.

(b) At the beginning of the reporting period, B Battery remained in a split configuration with B(-) at FSB Thu Thua (vicinity XS547702) and B(Plt) at FSB Tra Cu (vicinity XS477904) with the mission of GS, IIFFORCEV with POF to 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (US) with supporting fires to 25th ARVN Division. On 11 February 1970, B Battery received notice to practice implementation of IIFFORCEV Artillery OFLAN 2-69, with the mission of GS, IIFFORCEV with POF to Capitol Military Assistance Command. B Battery moved one howitzer by road march to FSB Sue (vicinity XS750840), occupied the position, registered and returned to FSB Thu Thua (vicinity XS547702). On 21 February 1970, B Battery displaced four howitzers by road march from FSB Thu Thua to FSB Redleg (vicinity XS509704) with the mission of GS, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (US) in support of Operation Jitterbug (vicinity XS4729) starting at 0930 hours and terminating on order from CO, supported unit. On 5 March 1970, B Battery moved by road march from FSB Thu Thua to FSB Concord (vicinity YT034174) with the mission of GS, IIFFORCEV with supporting fires to Long Binh Special Zone. On 9 April 1970, B Battery moved by road march from FSB Concord to FSB Michelle (vicinity YT279101) with the mission of GS, IIFFORCEV with POF to 199th Light Infantry Brigade. On 11 April 1970, B Battery displaced by road march from FSB Michelle to FSB Concord (vicinity YT034175) with the mission of GS, IIFFORCEV with supporting fires to Long Binh Special Zone. On 27 April 1970, B Battery displaced from FSB Concord to FSB Harry (vicinity XT339040) and assumed the role of GS, IIFFORCEV as part of Task Force Baker with supporting fires provided to III Corps Artillery elements.

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(c) At the beginning of the reporting period, C Battery was located at FSB Concord (vicinity YTO35174) with the mission of GS, IIFORCEV with supporting fires to the Long Binh Special Zone. On 3 March 1970, C Battery displaced by road march from FSB Concord to FSB Colorado (vicinity YS315805) and assumed the mission of GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, with supporting fires provided to 18th ARVN Division. On 4 March 1970, the Headquarters element of C Battery moved by road march to Camp William S. Price with the mission of administrative and logistic support of the firing battery located at FSB Colorado. On 10 April 1970, C Battery moved by road march from FSB Colorado to FSB Thu Thua (vicinity XS547702) and FSB Tan Tru (vicinity XS655620) assuming a split configuration with the mission of GS, IIFORCEV with POF to 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (US), with supporting fires to 25th ARVN Division. On 20 April 1970, the three tubes of C Battery at Thu Thua displaced to an unnamed FSB at grid XS508704 and assumed the role of GSR to 2/4 Artillery.

(d) During the reporting period both Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Service Battery were located at the base camp, Camp William S. Price (vicinity YTO45117), and continued their role of battalion support for the entire reporting period.

(8) During the reporting period, the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery engaged in operations of GSR, 25th Division Artillery, supporting fires provided to 5th ARVN Division. At the beginning of the reporting period Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery was located at Dau Tieng Base Camp (XT498469) and the Service Battery, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, was at Cu Chi base camp (XT655157).

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period A Battery was located at FSB Hull with the mission of GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery. On 1 April 1970, two tubes moved to Binh Phuoc (vicinity XS361550), operating under the control of 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery. The two tubes returned to FSB Hull on 10 April 1970. On 28 April 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Hull to FSB Laurel (vicinity XT200345) as part of Task Force Baker. A Battery's mission at FSB Laurel became GS, IIFORCEV with supporting fires provided to III Corps Artillery elements. On 30 April 1970, A Battery displaced from FSB Laurel to FSB Lou (vicinity XT194292). The unit's mission remained the same.

(b) At the beginning of the reporting period B Battery was located at FSB Washington, with the mission of GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery. On 1 February 1970, the Battery moved to the vicinity of XT130580 for a one day operation. On 13 February 1970, the Battery moved from FSB Washington for a three day operation to the vicinity of XT113599. On 3 April 1970, B Battery moved to FSB Illingsworth (vicinity XT039791). On 4 April 1970, B Battery moved to FSB Wood (vicinity XT044795), and its mission was changed to GSR, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. On 29 April 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Wood to FSB Washington (vicinity XT146568) and assumed the role of GS, IIFORCEV.

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(c) At the beginning of the reporting period C Battery was located at Dau Tieng Base Camp (vicinity XT494477), with the mission of GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery. On 13 February 1970, C Battery moved from Dau Tieng Base Camp to Lai Khe Base Camp, going on to FSB Thunder II (vicinity XT783552) on 14 February 1970. The Battery returned to Dau Tieng Base Camp on 21 February 1970. On 2 March 1970, the Battery moved to FSB Junction City (vicinity XT632508). On 7 March 1970, C Battery moved to FSB Daring (vicinity XT578622). On 12 March 1970, C Battery moved back to Junction City. On 16 March 1970, C Battery returned to Dau Tieng Base Camp. On 3 April 1970, C Battery moved from Dau Tieng Base Camp to FSB Washington (vicinity XT146568). On 28 April 1970, C Battery departed FSB Washington for FSB Murray (vicinity XT091445) and became part of Task Force Baker. At FSB Murray the unit's mission became CS, IFFORCE with supporting fires provided to III Corps Artillery elements. On 30 April 1970, C Battery displaced from FSB Murray to FSB Murray II (vicinity XT098408) with the mission remaining the same.

(d) During the reporting period Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Service Battery continued their role of battalion support. The Service Battery remained at Cu Chi Base Camp (vicinity XT655157). The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery remained at Dau Tieng Base Camp (vicinity XT498469) until 7 February 1970, when it moved to Cu Chi Base Camp (vicinity XT618158) on a permanent basis.

(9) At the beginning of the reporting period Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery was located at Xuan Loc (vicinity YT472095) and the Service Battery at Long Binh (vicinity VT043075).

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period Battery A was located at FSB Rita (vicinity YT302248) with the mission of GSR, 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery with POF to 199th Light Infantry Brigade, supporting fires to 18th ARVN Division. On 4 February 1970, A Battery moved six howitzers from FSB Rita with no change in mission. On 12 February 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Rita to FSB Kane (vicinity YT373336) with no change in mission. On 26 February 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Mace (vicinity YT627113) with no change in mission. On 3 March 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Mace to FSB Charlene (vicinity YT362272) with no change in mission. On 8 March 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Charlene, redesignated FSB Len, to FSB Mat Troi Moc (vicinity YT937211) to FSB Moon (vicinity YT888202) with no change in mission. On 29 March 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Moon to FSB Mat Troi Moc with no change in mission. On 4 April 1970, A Battery moved from FSB Mat Troi Moc to FSB Dinh II (vicinity YT819368) with no change in mission. On 18 April 1970 at approximately 0305 hours, FSB Dinh II was attacked by enemy forces. The enemy weapons used in the indirect fire attack included 60 and 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifle, 840 rounds and .51 caliber machinegun. An estimated 200 to 300 incoming mortar rounds were used in this attack. Shortly after the indirect fire was initiated, ground probes were made from several directions at once. Battery A employed its M109 howitzers in the direct fire role and continued to fire throughout the attack. As a result of this attack,

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Battery A lost two M109 howitzers and large quantities of smaller equipment. Enemy losses were reported as 25 KIA (body count), 2 POW, seventy 60mm mortar rounds, sixty 82mm mortar rounds, and a number of small arms CIA. On 26 April 1970, Battery A moved from FSB Dinh II (vicinity YT819368) to Duster Compound (vicinity YT131113), mission was GSR, IIFFORCEV, POF defense Long Binh Special Zone. On 29 April 1970, Battery A moved from Duster Compound to FSB Jake (vicinity XT628811), mission changed to GSR, IIFFORCEV. On 30 April 1970, Battery A moved from FSB Jake to FSB South I (vicinity XT545901) mission changed to GSR, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery.

(b) At the beginning of the reporting period B Battery was located at FSB Nancy (vicinity YT566379) with the mission of GSR, 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery with POF to 199th Light Infantry Brigade, supporting fires to 18th ARVN Division. On 10 March 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Nancy (vicinity YT566379) to FSB Mace (vicinity YT628114) with no change in mission. On 11 March 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Mace to FSB Dinh (vicinity YT914098) with no change in mission. On 4 April 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Dinh to FSB Buom (vicinity YT730249) with no change in mission. On 15 April 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Buom to FSB Mat (ZTO17154) with no change in mission. On 15 April 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Rita to FSB Mat (vicinity ZTO17154). The Battery's mission at FSB Mat was GS, IIFFORCEV with POF to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade.

(c) At the beginning of the reporting period C Battery was located at Nui Dat (vicinity YT346677) with the mission of GSR, 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery with POF to 1st Australian Task Force. On 12 February 1970, C Battery moved from Nui Dat to FSB Moose (vicinity YT129715), mission changed to GSR, IIFFORCEV Artillery. On 13 February 1970, C Battery moved from FSB Moose to FSB Polly (vicinity YT183723) with no change in mission. On 14 February 1970, C Battery moved from FSB Polly to FSB O'Keefe (vicinity YT196836) with no change in mission. On 15 February 1970, C Battery moved from FSB O'Keefe to FSB Elaine (vicinity YU597178) and assumed the mission of GSR, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery, supporting fires to 5th ARVN Division. On 2 March 1970, C Battery moved from FSB Elaine to FSB Bunard (vicinity YU253902) with no change in mission. On 3 March 1970, C Battery moved from FSB Bunard to FSB Concord (vicinity YTO33174) to FSB Horseshoe (vicinity YS495620) and assumed the mission of GSR, 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery with POF to 1st Australian Task Force and supporting fires to 18th ARVN Division. During the period 11 March through 14 March 1970, C Battery moved from FSB Horseshoe to grid YS556614 daily to participate in artillery raids in support of tactical operations conducted by the 1st Australian Task Force. On 17 March 1970, C Battery moved from FSB Horseshoe to Nui Dat (YS428665) with no change in mission. On 23 March 1970, C Battery moved from Nui Dat to FSB Exodus (vicinity YS212856) and assumed the mission of GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, POF to 3d Brigade, supporting fires to 18th ARVN Division. On 24 March 1970, C Battery moved from FSB Exodus to Nui Dat and reassumed the mission of GSR,

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1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, POF to 1st Australian Task Force, supporting fires to 18th ARVN Division. On 3 April 1970, C Battery moved two howitzers from Nui Dat to FSB Dan (vicinity YT588580) with the mission of GSR, IIFORCEV Artillery, POF to 199th Light Infantry Brigade, supporting fires to 18th ARVN Division. On 10 April 1970, C Battery moved the remaining four howitzers from Nui Dat to FSB Colorado (YS315805) and assumed the mission of GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, POF to 3d Brigade, supporting fires to 18th ARVN Division. On 18 April 1970, two tubes of C Battery displaced from FSB Dan to FSB Colorado. The unit's mission at FSB Colorado was GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery. On 19 April 1970, the two tubes of C Battery left FSB Colorado for Nui Dat (vicinity YS428665) and assumed the role of GS, IIFORCEV with POF to 1st Australian Task Force. On 21 April 1970, the Battery displaced from Nui Dat to FSB Discovery (vicinity YS608683); the mission remained the same. On 30 April 1970, Battery C moved from FSB Discovery (YS608683) to Nui Dat (YS428665) with no change in mission.

(d) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery was located at Xuan Loc at the beginning of the reporting period. It is now located at Long Binh (vicinity YT043075) where it continues its support role for the battalion.

(10) During the reporting period the 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery engaged in operations supporting 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 1st Infantry Division, 5th ARVN Division and 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery and Service Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery remained at Phu Loi (vicinity XT848155).

(a) On 1 April 1970, three howitzers of A Battery moved from FSB Buttons to FSB Judy (vicinity YU253145) by rotary wing aircraft. On 21 April 1970, A Battery displaced from FSB Judy to FSB Granite (vicinity XU927084). A Battery's mission at FSB Granite was GS, IIFORCEV with POF to 2d ARVN Airborne. On 26 April 1970, A Battery left FSB Granite and moved to FSB Hong Ha (vicinity XU844138) with the same mission of GS, IIFORCEV but with supporting fires provided to the 3d ARVN Airborne.

(b) On 2 February 1970, three howitzers of B Battery located at Phuoc Binh moved to FSB Jamie (XT484718) by rotary wing aircraft with a mission of GSR, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. On 10 March 1970, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery moved from FSB Jamie to FSB Joe (XT626662) by rotary wing aircraft, with a mission of GSR, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. On 29 March 1970, B Battery, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery moved from FSB Joe to FSB Hannas (XT032719) by rotary wing aircraft with a mission of GSR, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. On 3 April 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Hannas to Thien Ngon by rotary wing aircraft and from Thien Ngon to Quan Loi Base Camp (XT822913) by C130 aircraft with a mission of GSR, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery.

(c) On 4 April 1970, C Battery moved from Quan Loi Base Camp to FSB

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Phi Ma (XT703113) with a mission of General Support, IIFFORCEV Artillery.

(d) On 13 February 1970, Battery F, 16th Artillery moved from FSB Thunder II by road to Phuoc Vinh (XT971495) with a mission of General Support Reinforcing 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery. On 14 February 1970, Battery F, 16th Artillery moved by rotary wing aircraft from Phuoc Vinh to FSB Melinda (YT167366) with a mission of General Support IIFFORCEV, Priority of Fires to 199th Light Infantry Brigade. On 21 February 1970, three howitzers of F/16 Artillery moved from FSB Melinda to FSB Thunder II (XT781556) by rotary wing aircraft with a mission of General Support Reinforcing 1st Infantry Division Artillery, supporting fires provided 5th ARVN Division. On 22 February 1970, Battery F, 16th Artillery completed a move from FSB Melinda to FSB Thunder II. Three howitzers were moved by rotary wing aircraft from FSB Melinda to FSB Thunder II. The remaining elements of the Battery were moved by rotary wing aircraft to Phuoc Vinh and then to Thunder II by road. On 16 March 1970, Battery F, 16th Artillery was located at FSB Thunder II, mission was changed to General Support, IIFFORCEV due to the displacement of 1st Infantry Division units from Thunder II. On 20 March 1970, Battery F, 16th Artillery moved from FSB Thunder II to Phu Loi Base Camp (XT849150) by road with a mission of General Support IIFFORCEV. On 22 March 1970, Battery F, 16th Artillery turned in their tubes in preparation for inactivation. On 30 March 1970, Battery F, 16th Artillery was inactivated.

(11) During the reporting period the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery engaged in operations of GSR, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and stand down for redeployment. The battalion began the reporting period attached to the 23d Artillery Group. On 1 March 1970, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery came under operational control of HQ USARV in preparation for redeployment on 15 March 1970 under USARV OPLAN 183-69. At the beginning of the reporting period Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery and Service Battery, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery were located at Phu Loi, RVN.

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period A Battery was located at Phu Loi with the mission of GS IIFFORCEV. On 2 February 1970, the Battery turned in their M102 howitzers to prepare for redeployment.

(b) At the beginning of the reporting period B Battery was located at FSB Pat (vicinity YS613818) with the mission of GS IIFFORCEV with POF to the 1st Australian Task Force. On 12 February 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Pat by air and convoy to FSB Horseshoe (vicinity YS494619) with no change in mission. On 19 February 1970, B Battery moved from FSB Horseshoe by convoy to Phu Loi (vicinity XT8517). The mission upon closure was GS IIFFORCEV (Standdown). On 23 February 1970, B Battery turned in their M102 howitzers to prepare for redeployment.

(c) At the beginning of the reporting period C Battery was located at

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FSB Thunder IV with the mission of GS 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. On 9 February 1970, C Battery moved from FSB Thunder IV to Phu Loi (vicinity XT8517) with the mission of GS IIFORCEV. On 12 February 1970, C Battery turned in their M102 howitzers in preparation for redeployment.

(d) The Battalion redeployed to CONUS on 15 March 1970.

(12) During the reporting period the 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery remained attached to the 23d Artillery Group, with the mission of GS II FFORCEV through 17 March 1970. On 18 March 1970, the battalion was placed under the operational control of USARV in preparation for redeployment to CONUS on 1 April 1970. During the reporting period Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Service Battery were located at Tay Ninh West Base Camp (XT156515).

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period A Battery was located at FSB Saint Barbara (XT277679) with the mission of GS IIFORCEV. On 8 March 1970 the battery displaced to Tay Ninh West Base Camp (XT171525) with the mission of GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery. On 10 March 1970, the Battery turned in their howitzers in preparation for redeployment to CONUS.

(b) At the beginning of the reporting period B Battery was located at FSB Lobo (XT884397) with the mission of GSR 1st Infantry Division Artillery. On 26 February 1970, the Battery displaced to Tay Ninh West Base Camp (XT171525) with the mission of GSR 25th Infantry Division Artillery. On 8 March 1970 the battery turned in their howitzers in preparation for redeployment to CONUS.

(c) At the beginning of the reporting period C Battery was located at Tay Ninh West Base Camp (XT171525) with the mission of GSR, 25th Infantry Division Artillery. On 19 February 1970, the Battery turned in their howitzers in preparation for redeployment to CONUS.

(d) The battalion redeployed to CONUS on 1 April 1970.

## (13) Ammunition Expenditures Chart

UNIT	NR MISSIONS	ROUNDS EXPENDED	
		105MM	155MM
2/13	1090	4,583	
7/9	3266	8,971	
1/27	4695		38,513
2/12	8902		43,988
F/16	465		3,993
2/35	3640		30,272
5/42	1679		35,596
TOTAL	23,737		152,362



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## c. Training

(1) Fire direction centers and howitzer sections continue to stress basic artillery procedures in order to insure timely and accurate fires in support of maneuver elements. Five hours of formal instruction of FDC procedures, Firing Battery procedures, and maintenance are required daily at all firing locations.

(2) Training at the CIDG Artillery School at Trang Sup Special Forces Camp continued during the reporting period. 75 students from Loc Minh, Duc Hue and Minh Thanh have completed training and graduated on 21 May 1970.

## d. Intelligence

(1) Security: The following security clearances were processed during the quarter:

TOP SECRET clearances validated.....	99
SECRET clearances granted.....	167
SECRET clearances validated.....	225
Interim SECRET clearances granted.....	12
Local Files Checks processed.....	559

(2) Visual Reconnaissance: During the period February 1970 to April 1970, Group continued to perform visual reconnaissance missions satisfactorily. A total of 330 VR missions were flown during this quarter compared to 334 VR missions flown for the 2d quarter FY70. Total hours decreased from 847 to 807.

## (3) Counter Mortar Radar:

(a) During this past quarter, the Group relinquished operational control of the 234th Radar Detachment. However, the 234th Radar Detachment, while under Group operational control, located a total of 18 enemy firing positions, out of a total of 18 attacks.

(b) The 234th Radar Detachment decreased non-operational time from 140:10 hours for the 2d quarter to 21:22 hours for this quarter. The 234th was placed under 25th Division on 16 March 1970.

## e. Logistics

(1) Normal supply and logistic support was provided to four 155mm battalions and two 105mm battalions. The 105mm battalions were redeployed on 15 March 1970 and 30 March 1970, respectively. An average of one fixed wing and 20 rotary wing resupply sorties were flown daily.

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(2) During the quarter, 7 batteries received USARV CMMI's. All batteries except one, received a satisfactory rating.

(3) Operation Keystone Bluejay for the Group was completed during the quarter as the 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm) and F Battery, 16th Artillery (155mm) were redeployed on 30 March 1970.

(4) During April, projects were initiated to upgrade the living and work areas at fire support bases. Work was also initiated to improve drainage repair/repair gun pits and improve perimeter and ammunition bunkers in preparation for the wet season.

(5) A comprehensive and strenuous program was initiated in April to reduce the deadline rates, especially for howitzers, M548's, FAD/C generators and power rammers and to improve the unit maintenance programs and overall maintenance posture of the Group.

(6) During April the battalions constructed pre-fab ammunition bunkers (Murphy Bunkers) which can be easily constructed, transported, assembled and emplaced, especially in forward fire support bases. This provides for fast adequate overhead cover for ammunition.

(7) Experiments were conducted to determine the feasibility of moving ammunition in M332 ammo trailers by helicopter to assist in moving ammunition at the fire support bases. Results were favorable and will be discussed in the Lessons Learned portion of the report.

(8) Assistance was provided to the ARVN Artillery at FSB Hull. Units of the Group helped construct gun pads and perimeter and living bunkers for two 155mm howitzer and their crews.

## f. Other

### (1) Aviation:

(a) The 23d Artillery Group Aviation Section continues to operate as a consolidated section.

(b) The assigned U6A remains an asset to the Group, but gradually the OH58's have acquired missions formerly flown by the U6A. Less utilization is noted because of a lack of fixed wing pilots. Agreement has been made with the 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Company to provide pilots in return for the use of the aircraft. Utilization should increase in the next quarter.

(c) The breakdown of missions and hours flown during the past quarter are:

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Rotary Wing: 18 OH58A's and 14 OH23G's (The number has varied throughout the reporting period as OH23G's have been replaced). VR Missions - 541; C&C Missions - 1922; Cargo/C Missions - 146; Troop/C Missions - 3235; Training Missions - 252; Maintenance Missions - 215; Total Missions - 6012; PAX - 12,632; Cargo - 155.4 tons; Hours - 5382.

Fixed Wing: 1 U6A. Troop/C Missions - 57; Cargo/C Missions - 4; Training Missions - 14; Maintenance Missions - 5; Total Missions - 80; Cargo - 3 tons; PAX - 147; Hours - 118.

## (2) Medicine:

(a) Skin diseases showed a 5% decrease this quarter as compared with the fourth quarter 1969. Other diseases, such as diarrhea, respiratory conditions, etc. did not show significant alterations. In this quarter there were 5 cases of malaria as compared with 4 cases in the fourth quarter of 1969. Chemoprophylaxis and good individual protective measures accounted for the low incidence.

(b) In this quarter, 9503 Medcap patients were seen as compared with 16,731 patients in the fourth quarter 1969. This reduction was due to loss of three Medcap programs when two battalions were deactivated and the 1/27 Artillery's move to another location, plus decreased Medcap activities during Tet. Vietnamization of the Medcaps has progressed at a slower than expected rate due to lack of Vietnamese medical resources and acceptance.

(3) Civil Affairs; During the past quarter, 140 Medcaps were conducted with a total of 9,503 patient visits. A total of 4,575 pounds of food was distributed. Separate institutions assisted during the reporting period were as follows:

- (a) Schools (13)
- (b) Hospitals and Dispensaries (23)
- (c) Orphanages (5)
- (d) Others (9)

## 2. (C) SECTION 2. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATION, EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. Personnel: None.
- b. Intelligence: None.
- c. Operations: None.

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## d. Organization:

(1) Observation: Batteries and battalions do not have sufficient construction equipment or organic hauling capability to sustain prolonged mobile operations, particularly when multiple battery moves are enacted.

## (2) Evaluation:

(a) Previous operations have shown that a need exists for a bulldozer to construct defensive positions for Artillery batteries. Operations such as the one being conducted by Task Force Baker in Cambodia requires Artillery units to move almost daily. These daily moves require the construction of numerous FSBs for which a bulldozer is vitally needed.

(b) Several batteries and battalions experienced difficulty supporting moves with organic hauling capacity. This problem became acute because of losses of vehicles due to enemy action and exceedingly long distances required for resupply because of the austere operation of forward support elements. TOE equipment strengths are not adequate to sustain mobile operations if the unit is required to resupply itself with organic vehicles. In addition to the ammunition required for combat operations, units must carry sufficient class IV materials to construct defensive positions upon arriving at a new location. The requirement to transport these materials has severely taxed the organic transportation assets of the units. Recent operations in Cambodia by Task Force Baker, have shown that units are required to make a number of shuttle runs between positions to complete a move. A choice often has to be made as to priorities of items to move, which often causes considerable inconvenience and decreased efficiency of some sections and/or operations. An immediate, temporary solution to the transportation problem was to augment the firing batteries with additional trucks. An average of six additional trucks were required by each firing battery. This problem could be alleviated with increased hauling capacity at battery and battalion level.

(3) Recommendation: That a study of Artillery TOE's for units in Vietnam be conducted with the object of adding Engineer equipment, e.g. bulldozers, and increasing the organic hauling capability of units to a point at which the unit is able to conduct prolonged mobile operation.

## e. Training

(1) Observation: In-Country orientation for aviators continues to be a problem.

(2) Evaluation: Missions of the 3d Artillery Group Aviation Section often require the use of all three passenger seats for command and control parties or a combination of cargo and passengers. Aircraft assigned such

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missions will not accommodate a second pilot. Consequently the newly arrived pilot cannot be exposed gradually to the mission requirements after he is proficient in flying the aircraft. Problems often encountered by a new pilot are:

(a) Loss of orientation, although the pilot is trained in school to read a map, the newly rated aviator finds it difficult to accomplish his mission without proper background in country. Detailed flight planning is impractical because of the diversity of the missions. If the pilot is not trained, he becomes a hindrance to his passenger, when in fact, his primary requirement is to assist in the accomplishment of the passenger's mission.

(b) Artillery avoidance becomes more complex day by day within III Corps. The establishment of numerous fire bases has increased the demand on pilots to be completely familiar with the area that he is flying through. Very often, complex corridors are suggested by AWCC's for artillery avoidance. A firm understanding of the area will allow circumnavigation without hesitation.

(c) New pilots lack an understanding of artillery, e.g. adjustment of fires and orientation of the aircraft during adjustment.

(3) Recommendation: A retraining program be established with primary emphasis upon in-country orientation and the use of aircraft by the artillery, consisting of a minimum of 100 hours of flying as co-pilot, techniques of adjusting artillery from the air, and a series of test flights followed by a comprehensive written test. If the aviator passes all tests, he is released to missions that require single pilots. However, the missions are carefully selected to insure the aviator gradual maturity before complex missions are daily assigned.

## f. Logistics

### (1) Pre-fab Ammunition Bunkers

(a) Observation: There is a need to have pre-fab ammunition bunkers, which are easily constructed, transported and assembled for use at fire support bases.

(b) Evaluation: Use of this type of prefabricated bunker enables ammunition to be put under cover quickly to withstand possible rocket/mortar attacks at fire support bases. The units of this command have been successful in constructing ammunition bunkers which can be easily assembled and disassembled and transported. The bunkers are made of PSP, engineering stakes and 6x6 wood frames. After the bunker is erected, it is sandbagged with a minimum of three layers of sandbags and provides fast

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adequate protection for approximately 120 rounds of 155mm ammunition. The 6x6 frames are reinforced with iron elbows and the PSP is interlocked on top of the frames. The back of the bunker is prepared by driving engineer stakes into the ground at a slight angle and then interlocking "SF" on top of the stakes. The sides are supported by engineer stakes driven into the ground approximately 12" apart. This takes approximately 45 minutes and provides the framework upon which three layers of sandbags are stacked around. A diagram of the bunker is attached at Inclosure 2.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders consider using this technique for pre-fab ammunition bunker construction.

(2) M332 Ammunition Trailers in Airmobile Operations:

(a) Observation: There is a need to quickly move ammunition from resupply pads into the howitzer positions at fire support bases.

(b) Evaluation: During the initial phase of an airmobile operation, it is critical that ammo be transported from the resupply pad to the howitzers immediately. Due to the limited lift and movement capability in the forward areas, this often is difficult to accomplish. A solution is to move ammunition loaded on M332 ammunition trailers into the forward area on the initial sorties. This allows the unit to immediately haul ammunition to the howitzers. The only serious disadvantage is that there is a reduction of 25 rounds per sortie; thereby requiring additional sorties to get the ammunition in. Considering the advantages and disadvantages, it appears feasible to initially insert one trailer per weapon to provide immediate ammunition movement capability at the new position. Subsequent to the base improvement and the initiation of routine resupply sorties, the number of trailers can be reduced to one per two howitzer sections.

(c) Recommendation: That ammunition be loaded on M332 ammunition trailers and moved onto the forward area in the initial sorties.

(3) Sand Bagging machine:

(a) Observation: Numerous manhours are expended filling sandbags each time a new fire support base is occupied.

(b) Evaluation: Manhours expended in filling sandbags could be devoted to more productive and essential operations such as maintenance and preparation and organization of the position area. Due to the slow, time consuming operation of filling sandbags, many units have experienced difficulty in preparing adequate protective structures prior to night fall on the first day of occupation of a new FSB. A total of 180,000 sandbags are filled a month by 23d Artillery Group units.

(c) Recommendation: That sandbagging machines be made available to all Artillery units as a part of the Engineer support provided during FSB construction.

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## g. Communications:

(1) Observation: Nonavailability of KY-28 mounts and control heads for the OH58A aircraft is holding up installation of Nestor equipment in the OH58A aircraft.

(2) Evaluation: An expedient solution to the problem of placing Nestor equipment in aircraft is to carry a field radio with a KY-38. Attempts to use the radio set AN/VRC-77 have been unsatisfactory for two reasons; it operates on New Squelch only and has very low power output. The interim solution presently in use is to mount an AN/VRC-46 radio set and a KT-38 on a cargo plate in the aircraft. A vehicular whip antenna is used bolted to the landing skids, horizontally pointing to the rear. Power for the AN/VRC-46 is taken from the 50 amp armament plug on the lower rear of the left front seat. The KY-38 operates from batteries. The aircraft batteries will not carry the load of the AN/VRC-46 so checks of the key setting are made with a jeep equipped with an extra power cord. Results have shown that this arrangement will provide the needed Nestor capability; however, there are two major disadvantages to this system. First, it takes up one passenger space and secondly, the radio cannot be keyed or monitored through the aircraft intercom system.

(3) Recommendation: That the above method of installing Nestor equipment in OH58A aircraft be adapted as an interim measure until sufficient KY-28 mounts and control heads become available.

## h. Aviation

(1) Observation: Engine repairs on the OH58A aircraft have often resulted in an unacceptable length of down time.

(2) Evaluation: After five months usage of the OH58A, it is estimated that 65% of all OH58A aircraft down time is due to engine repair. The major cause of aircraft down time can be attributed to faulty fuel control units, leaking generator seals, leaking free wheeling unit seals and compressor seals. Engine changes have resulted in down time of from six to forty-three days, average down time is approximately twenty days. When an aircraft goes to support maintenance for engine repairs or changes, causes for delay in accomplishing the needed repairs are often attributable to either lack of parts or lack of personnel to work on the aircraft due to heavy work loads. Delays caused by the DSU's lack of personnel can be lessened materially by providing 23d Group maintenance personnel to go to the DSU with the aircraft to assist with any maintenance that they are qualified to perform. It has been found beneficial to coordinate daily with the DSU to assure maximum effective use of maintenance personnel efforts. In addition to providing more personnel to work on a given aircraft, personal attention can be given to 23d Group aircraft and additional maintenance

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initiated immediately when the need is discovered. An additional benefit derived from this arrangement is on-the-job training for Group maintenance personnel in a semicontrolled atmosphere.


(3) Recommendation: That the above method of providing maintenance assistance for aircraft be adopted by all appropriate units.

## 1. Civil Affairs

(1) Observation: Insufficient emphasis has been placed on self-help Civic Action Programs.

(2) Evaluation: As US troop withdrawals continue, there must be a greater assumption of responsibility for Civic Action by the Vietnamese. Otherwise, programs initiated and supported by US personnel will not progress.

(3) Recommendation: Civic Action programs conducted jointly with Vietnamese civilian and ARVN should be stressed. MEDCAP's should involve Vietnamese as well as US medical personnel. Instruction in construction methods for drainage and sanitation facilities would be more beneficial in the long run than the simple provision of the materials needed for such construction. Our aid to youth groups, such as the Boy Scouts, should emphasize leadership training rather than material support. Such training programs will provide leaders to continue strong Civic Action programs when US support is no longer available.



JOHN E. BAKER  
Colonel, FA  
Commanding

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- 2 - Commander In Chief, United States Army Pacific
- 3 - Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam
- 4 - Commanding Officer, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery

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AVFB-FAC (14 May 1970) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 23d  
Artillery Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, LGS-CSFOR-65 (12)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed the quarterly report of the 23d Artillery Group and concurs in operations and lessons learned as reported with the following exception:

Para 2f (2): M332 Ammunition Trailers in Airmobile Operations.

(1) The observation presented is valid; however, the limited availability of air assets precludes utilization of trailers as recommended.

(2) The use of trailers should be limited to initial occupation of position, and at a ratio of one trailer to two howitzer positions. This minimizes the loss of effective lift capacity and still provides the mobility needed for rapid occupation of position.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R.G. PARRISH  
LTC, FA  
Adjutant

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AVFBC-RE (14 May 70) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, HQ, II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 10 JUN 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, and concurs except as indicated in paragraph 2, below.

2. (C) The following comments are provided:

a. Reference item concerning "Need for Construction Equipment or Organic Hauling Capability", page 15, paragraph 2d: concur. Reporting unit is being advised to submit, for consideration, request for MTOE with full justification for additional equipment and personnel for its operation.

b. Reference item concerning "In-Country Orientation for Aviators", page 15, paragraph 2e: concur. Aviator orientation and training in country is a unit responsibility. Each unit should establish a training program to provide its aviators with the required area orientation and special mission techniques. The number of training hours required by the individual aviator will vary with the prior experience and proficiency of the aviator, as well as with area of operation and special mission requirements of the unit.

c. Reference item concerning "Pre-fab Ammunition Bunkers", page 16, paragraph 2f(1): concur; however the dimensions of M8A1 matting published in TM 5-337 are 11' 9 3/4" X 1' 7 1/2". Recommend that the side dimensions of the structure be reduced to 11' 9 3/4" to allow for sufficient bearing on the caps. It should be noted that the engineer stakes shown in the side view are not spaced to scale.

d. Reference item concerning "Sand Bagging Machine", page 17, paragraph 2f(3): concur; however this headquarters knows of no sand bagging machine which is type classified as standard in the inventory.

e. Reference item concerning "Nonavailability of KY-28 Mounts and Control Heads for the OH 58A Aircraft", page 18, paragraph 2g: concur. There are several recognized problems in installing NESTOR equipment in the OH 58A. Until these problems are solved, interim measures, such as those employed by 23d Artillery Group, can be used.


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AVFBC-RE (14 May 70) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

f. Reference item concerning "Engine Repairs on the OH 58A Aircraft", page 18, paragraph 2h: concur. The working relationship between a DSU and its customers may determine both the quality and quantity of work produced by the DSU. Providing it is agreeable to both the DSU and the customer, it would be advantageous to all concerned to have organizational maintenance personnel accompany equipment into support maintenance, a practice that is policy in many DSU's.

FOR THE COMMANDER

  
W. C. BARTEL, JR.  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

CF:  
CO, II FFORCEV Arty  
CO, 23d Arty Gp

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AVHGC-DST (14 May 70) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 23d  
Artillery Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 1 JUL 70

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Need for Construction Equipment and Organic Hauling Capability," page 15, paragraph 2d(1) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2a: nonconcur. The addition of engineer equipment to artillery battery and battalion MTOE does not appear to be justified. Current doctrine dictates that Engineer support of this type should be provided by divisional and corps Engineer units. The addition of Engineer equipment to artillery units would require additional spaces for operators and maintenance personnel. Personnel spaces are not available at HQ, USARV to finance such an increase in strength. The 2d Indorsement indicates that the unit has been instructed to initiate MTOE action to document the proposed changes. As of this date no submission has been received by this Headquarters. The unit commander has recommended that a study of Artillery TOE's be conducted with the object of adding Engineer equipment to artillery units. Recommend that this item be brought to the attention of USACDC. Action by DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "In-country Orientation for Aviators," page 15, paragraph 3e, and paragraph 2b, 2d Indorsement: concur. In-country orientation for aviators is a unit responsibility. The conduct of a 100 hour training program such as is recommended by this unit for newly-assigned aviators is the prerogative of the unit commander. However, under the circumstances described, it would appear that a newly-assigned aviator should be given the least demanding missions. As he becomes more familiar with the terrain, the supported unit's requirements, and the aviation techniques employed, he may be given missions which are more complex. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

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AVHGC-DST (14 May 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS-CSFOR-65 (R2)

c. Reference item concerning "Sand Bagging Machine," page 17, paragraph f(3) and 2d Ind, paragraph 2d: concur. However, no sand bagging machine exists which is type classified as standard. Units in the field have used ditch digging machines and, most effectively, a wooden hopper type structure which is filled at the top by shovels or belt conveyors, has a sliding door at the bottom, to which the sand bags are attached and filled. Recommend that the Combat Development Command look into the possibility of a light weight, airmobile, sand bagging machine which could be issued to field units. Action by DA is recommended.

d. Reference item concerning "Communications," page 18, paragraph 3g, and paragraph 2e, 2d Indorsement: nonconcur. By message 23 May 1970, USARV informed all units having OH-58 aircraft to contact AMMC directly for the issue of a KY-28 control head and mount for each OH-58 aircraft. Because KY-28 mounts and control heads for OH-58 aircraft are available, interim measures, are not necessary. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

e. Reference item concerning "Engine Repair Parts for the OH-58 Aircraft," page 18, paragraph 3h, and paragraph 2f, 2d Indorsement: concur. The DSU's would welcome such assistance. However, not all units can afford to send maintenance personnel to the DSU to assist in repair due to the shortage of aviation maintenance personnel. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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II FFORCEV  
23d Arty Gp

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
GPOP-DT (14 May 70) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 23d Artillery Group, for  
period ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 5 AUG 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department  
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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
III ARVN CORPS OPERATION IN CAMBODIA




PRE-FAB AMMO BUNKER  
CAPACITY 120 155MM ROUNDS

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( FRONT VIEW )



( SIDE VIEW )



Incl 2

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